Changes in Attitude. Philosophical Perspectives.
Can we be epistemically required to have one type of doxastic attitude because we have a different type? I explore an argument for a negative answer.
Can we be epistemically required to have one type of doxastic attitude because we have a different type? I explore an argument for a negative answer.
Reasoning Beyond Belief (Acquisition). Noûs.
I argue that we can reason to many more attitudinal states: new lacks of belief, new token admiration (hatred, etc.), and new lacks of admiration (hatred, etc.).
I argue that we can reason to many more attitudinal states: new lacks of belief, new token admiration (hatred, etc.), and new lacks of admiration (hatred, etc.).
Wondering on and with Purpose. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind.
An account of what it is to wonder about a question as considering potential answers in a certain structured way, rather than as wanting to know the answer to it.
An account of what it is to wonder about a question as considering potential answers in a certain structured way, rather than as wanting to know the answer to it.
The Attitudes We Can Have. The Philosophical Review.
I present a fundamental contrast between doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes, and a theory of both that makes sense of puzzling ways we can and can't have them.
I present a fundamental contrast between doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes, and a theory of both that makes sense of puzzling ways we can and can't have them.
Policy Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Part philosophy of language on attitude ascriptions (conditional and not), and part normative philosophy defending an externalism about non-doxastic attitudes.
Part philosophy of language on attitude ascriptions (conditional and not), and part normative philosophy defending an externalism about non-doxastic attitudes.
A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
A theory about the proper communication of all attitudes, meant to subsume popular views about assertion.
A theory about the proper communication of all attitudes, meant to subsume popular views about assertion.
When Propriety Is Improper. (with Kevin Blackwell) Philosophical Studies.
An attack on the requirement from formal epistemology that epistemic utility functions be "proper".
An attack on the requirement from formal epistemology that epistemic utility functions be "proper".
Neo-Stoicism and What It Can Do. Ergo.
A theory of non-belief/non-desire attitudes and why Reflection doesn't apply to them.
A theory of non-belief/non-desire attitudes and why Reflection doesn't apply to them.
Works in Progress and/or Under Review (Comments very welcome!)
Paper on attitude ascriptions and speech acts.
I give a linguistic theory of the sorts of attitude ascriptions that appear in "Policy Externalism" and "The Attitudes We Can Have", and argue that it is (linguistically) superior to its rivals. I also argue that the phenomenon is much more general than has generally been noticed, encompassing speech acts.
Paper on what it is to have a question, and the relation between having a question and epistemic requirements to believe.
I argue that a lot of counterexamples to plausible epistemic requirements to form particular beliefs no longer work if we think more carefully about the proper form any diachronic epistemic requirement ought to take, specifically if we look at what having a question is. Along the way I give a theory of doxastic deliberation.
Paper on discourse ethics.
I investigate what ethical restrictions on how we can rationally persuade another person there might be, and where they might come from.
Paper on attitude ascriptions and speech acts.
I give a linguistic theory of the sorts of attitude ascriptions that appear in "Policy Externalism" and "The Attitudes We Can Have", and argue that it is (linguistically) superior to its rivals. I also argue that the phenomenon is much more general than has generally been noticed, encompassing speech acts.
Paper on what it is to have a question, and the relation between having a question and epistemic requirements to believe.
I argue that a lot of counterexamples to plausible epistemic requirements to form particular beliefs no longer work if we think more carefully about the proper form any diachronic epistemic requirement ought to take, specifically if we look at what having a question is. Along the way I give a theory of doxastic deliberation.
Paper on discourse ethics.
I investigate what ethical restrictions on how we can rationally persuade another person there might be, and where they might come from.
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