Policy Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
I argue that which non-doxastic attitudes we can or do have are not limited by informational constraints that limit which doxastic attitudes we can have. I then use that fact to argue for what I call policy externalism about various kinds of attitudes: the most reasonable policies for those attitudes won't require the agent to believe that circumstances that rationalize the attitude obtain. This will mean that reasonable and decently introspective people will often, perhaps typically, be ignorant of a great many of our non-doxastic attitudes, and even that we can sometimes only find out that we have these attitudes at all by finding out non-attitudinal facts about the world. This also helps us account for some linguistic behavior that is prima facie odd.
I argue that which non-doxastic attitudes we can or do have are not limited by informational constraints that limit which doxastic attitudes we can have. I then use that fact to argue for what I call policy externalism about various kinds of attitudes: the most reasonable policies for those attitudes won't require the agent to believe that circumstances that rationalize the attitude obtain. This will mean that reasonable and decently introspective people will often, perhaps typically, be ignorant of a great many of our non-doxastic attitudes, and even that we can sometimes only find out that we have these attitudes at all by finding out non-attitudinal facts about the world. This also helps us account for some linguistic behavior that is prima facie odd.
A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
I defend a theory of when it's appropriate to communicate a given non-doxastic attitude. It's rightness-based as opposed to fittingness-based and it has a contrastivistish structure.
I defend a theory of when it's appropriate to communicate a given non-doxastic attitude. It's rightness-based as opposed to fittingness-based and it has a contrastivistish structure.
Neo-Stoicism and What It Can Do. Ergo.
I defend a qualified version of what I call soft neo-Stoicism about mental states other than belief, preference, and what I (following Lewis) call cool attitudes: no agent is rationally required to be in any (disjunction of) such states. I then show how we can use the truth of this thesis to give a relatively precise and fruitful characterization of the subjective, as it has figured in recent philosophy and linguistics; and then I show how it generates counterexamples not only to Reflection about belief, but also Reflection about most other attitude-types.
I defend a qualified version of what I call soft neo-Stoicism about mental states other than belief, preference, and what I (following Lewis) call cool attitudes: no agent is rationally required to be in any (disjunction of) such states. I then show how we can use the truth of this thesis to give a relatively precise and fruitful characterization of the subjective, as it has figured in recent philosophy and linguistics; and then I show how it generates counterexamples not only to Reflection about belief, but also Reflection about most other attitude-types.
When Propriety Is Improper. (with Kevin Blackwell) Philosophical Studies.
We provide a precise characterization of the requirement that agents be immodest, i.e., that their credence functions' expected inaccuracy be less than any other credence functions' expected inaccuracy; we then provide an argument against it involving violations of conditionalization; and finally we explore what the restricted circumstances are in which immodesty is plausibly rationally required. Email one of us for a draft!
We provide a precise characterization of the requirement that agents be immodest, i.e., that their credence functions' expected inaccuracy be less than any other credence functions' expected inaccuracy; we then provide an argument against it involving violations of conditionalization; and finally we explore what the restricted circumstances are in which immodesty is plausibly rationally required. Email one of us for a draft!
Paper on Deliberation and Non-Doxastic Attitudes (blinded for review).
I argue that we shouldn't take particulars into account when forming most non-doxastic attitudes; we should only consider general features. I motivate this view by arguing for a rational requirement on every one of the attitudes: we should treat like objects alike. I make this principle intuitive by looking at cases, but then argue that there are no good existing explanations as to why this should be a rational requirement. This provides an argument for extending an epistemic consequentialism-like project to non-doxastic attitudes. See chapter 3 of the dissertation for more!
I argue that we shouldn't take particulars into account when forming most non-doxastic attitudes; we should only consider general features. I motivate this view by arguing for a rational requirement on every one of the attitudes: we should treat like objects alike. I make this principle intuitive by looking at cases, but then argue that there are no good existing explanations as to why this should be a rational requirement. This provides an argument for extending an epistemic consequentialism-like project to non-doxastic attitudes. See chapter 3 of the dissertation for more!
Paper on Desire and Moral Rationalism (blinded for review).
I argue that the nature of desire makes it possible to have desires that we might not have thought we could have before, and that this motivates a kind of moral rationalism. See chapter 3 of the dissertation for details!
I argue that the nature of desire makes it possible to have desires that we might not have thought we could have before, and that this motivates a kind of moral rationalism. See chapter 3 of the dissertation for details!
Platonic Infallibility about the Good but not the True.
I argue that the Socratic thesis that we all (or, as I argue, most of us) desire the actual good falls out of a Platonic conception of the attitudes that is philosophically and linguistically plausible. I show how this makes sense of passages in the Meno, Gorgias, Lysis, and Republic, and allows him to avoid some standard objections to that theory. This is a historical companion to "Policy Externalism" and some of the other papers on this page.
I argue that the Socratic thesis that we all (or, as I argue, most of us) desire the actual good falls out of a Platonic conception of the attitudes that is philosophically and linguistically plausible. I show how this makes sense of passages in the Meno, Gorgias, Lysis, and Republic, and allows him to avoid some standard objections to that theory. This is a historical companion to "Policy Externalism" and some of the other papers on this page.
Paper on Journalistic Neutrality Norms.
I investigate how best to formulate and motivate the idea that journalists shouldn't take sides in political controversies in their reporting. It might seem like there's an epistemic problem that such norms can solve, namely that not being neutral will make our political common ground too small, but this motivation ultimately fails. I then supply a substitute norm that aren't really neutrality norms but still captures a lot of what was intuitive about them. Email me for a draft!
I investigate how best to formulate and motivate the idea that journalists shouldn't take sides in political controversies in their reporting. It might seem like there's an epistemic problem that such norms can solve, namely that not being neutral will make our political common ground too small, but this motivation ultimately fails. I then supply a substitute norm that aren't really neutrality norms but still captures a lot of what was intuitive about them. Email me for a draft!
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