

Daniel Drucker

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Current position

Postdoctoral fellow, University of Helsinki, under Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

Past position

2017–2019 Postdoctoral Fellow, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

Areas of specialization

Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, and Philosophy of Mind

Areas of competence

Moral Psychology, Social Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, and Logic

Education

2017 PhD in Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Dissertation: “Attitudes Beyond Belief: A Theory of Rational Non-Doxastic Attitude Formation and Evaluation”
Committee: Eric Swanson (chair), Sarah Moss, Brian Weatherson, and Ezra Keshet (linguistics)

2014 Visiting Student, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT

2013 Visiting Student, Arché, St Andrews

2011 AB (*hons.*) in Philosophy, University of Chicago

Publications

forthcoming “The Attitudes We Can Have”, *The Philosophical Review*

2019 “Policy Externalism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, [10.1111/phpr.12425](https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12425)

“A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, [10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024)

“When Propriety Is Improper” (w/ Kevin Blackwell), *Philosophical Studies*, [10.1007/s11098-017-1020-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1020-4)

2016 “Neo-Stoicism and What It Can Do”, *Ergo*, [10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.021](https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.021)

Under review

A paper on non-doxastic attitudes
A paper on epistemic rules

Honors and awards

- 2018 Honorable Mention, ProQuest Distinguished Dissertation Award
Selected by Michigan's philosophy department as the best dissertation of 2017, selected by the Michigan Society of Fellows for Honorable Mention
- 2016–2017 Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship
University-wide competition including increased stipend and yearlong teaching release
- 2016 Charles L. Stevenson Award
\$3,000 awarded to best dissertation proposal and chapter submitted that year
- Weinberg Summer Dissertation Fellowship
Rackham One-Term Fellowship
Phi Kappa Phi
- 2013 Marshall M. Weinberg Summer Fellowship
- 2010 Phi Beta Kappa

Talks¹

- 2019 “Questioning Epistemic Requirements”, UNAM
*“The Optionality of *Modus Ponens* and Other Epistemic Rules”, Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, University of British Columbia
*“People Epistemically Ought to Learn Philosophy”, Society for Exact Philosophy, York University
- 2018 “The Optionality of *Modus Ponens* and Other Epistemic Rules”, seminario de la epistemología, UNAM
“The Attitudes We Can Have”, Mini-conference on Epistemic Competence, University of Helsinki
*“The Duty to Present Opposed Reasons”, Humboldt Normativity Conference, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
“Plato’s General Theory of Non-Doxastic Attitudes”, Seminario de Investigación en Filosofía Antigua y su Recepción, UNAM
“Decision-Theoretic Epistemology and Occasional Conversion”, Seminario de Investigadores, UNAM
- 2017 (with Kevin Blackwell) “When Propriety Is Improper”, Foundations of Belief and Decision-Making, Michigan
- 2016 “Conversational Goals and the Ethics of Conversation”, Michigan
“Policy Externalism”, Michigan
- 2015 “Judging and Experience”, Michigan
“Miners’ Puzzles and the Uses of Normative Language”, University of Pennsylvania
- 2014 “Inegalitarian Relativism”, Michigan Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop and MIT
*“There Are Good Things”, Princeton-Michigan Metaethics
- 2013 *“Has Expressivism Made Good on Its Vindictory Ambitions?”, Princeton-Michigan Metaethics
*“How Satisfying Is Conventional Satisfaction?”, Michigan, International Plato Society

Selected comments

- 2017 Casey Perin, “Why Socrates Fails to Refute Polus”, West Coast Plato Workshop, UC Davis
Nate Charlow, “Decision-Theoretic Relativity in Deontic Modality”, Michigan Alumni Conference
- 2016 Ralph Wedgwood, “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic”, Ethics of Belief, Michigan
- 2015 Jeff C. King, “W(h)ither Semantics! (?)”, Theory of Meaning, Michigan
- 2013 Mandy Simons, “Projection as a Function of Information Structuring”, Michigan Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop

¹ ‘*’ indicates refereed.

Teaching

UNAM

- 2018 Formal Methods in Philosophy (graduate)
Epistemology and General Normativity (graduate)

University of Michigan

- 2015 Human Nature (sole instructor)
Philosophy and Narrative (sole instructor)
Philosophical Problems (for Sarah Moss)
- 2014 Intermediate Symbolic Logic (for Jamie Tappenden)
- 2013 Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (for Matt Evans)
Introductory Logic (for Gordon Belot)
- 2012 Law and Philosophy (for Elizabeth Anderson)

Service to the profession

REFEREEING

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Critica, Debate Feminista, Episteme, Erkenntnis, Inquiry, Mind (x2),
Philosophers' Annual, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

CONFERENCE ORGANIZING

- 2017 First Annual Michigan Alumni Conference (with Zoë Johnson King)
With talks by Karen Bennett, Nate Charlow, Connie Rosati, Nishi Shah, and Holly Smith
- 2016 Ethics of Belief (with Anna Edmonds), University of Michigan
With talks by Nomy Arpaly, Selim Berker, Miriam Schoenfield, and Ralph Wedgwood
- 2015 Theory of Meaning: Mathematics or Psychology? (with Boris Babic, Cat Saint-Croix, and Patrick Shirreff)
With talks by Elisabeth Camp, Jeff King, Florian Schwarz, and Zoltàn Gendler Szabò

GRADUATE SERVICE POSITIONS

- 2016–2017 MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) Facilitator
- 2015–2017 Organizer, Graduate Student Working Group
- 2013–2014 Graduate Representative to the Faculty
- 2012–2013 Social Chair

Dissertation abstract

I present and explore a normative theory of non-doxastic attitudes like desire, hatred, and admiration. The viewpoint is general and abstract: independent of any particular flavor or source of normativity, I explore general features any acceptable way of forming these attitudes would have, especially in contrast to doxastic attitudes like belief. The first three chapters present a relatively unified picture of non-doxastic attitude formation, grounded in types of non-doxastic attitudes we can have in contrast to their impossible doxastic analogues. In particular, I first defend a kind of externalism, according to which the best updating policies to have for these attitudes will not essentially involve believing or being confident that some given circumstances obtain. I then apply it to a specific attitude, desire, to show how the approach works, especially to argue for a kind of moral rationalism to the effect that we are obligated to have

certain desires simply because we are morally obligated to have them. Then based on a different aspect of the view, I present what I take to be some of the best ways to motivate the view, and some of the best ways to criticize it, as well. In the last chapter, I develop a theory about how these attitudes are best communicated, this time meant to capture how belief is best communicated, too, though it is inspired by certain features of non-doxastic attitudes.

You can read my dissertation on my website: <http://www.danieldrucker.org/research.html>.

References

1. Eric Swanson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
ericsw@umich.edu
2. Sarah Moss, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
ssmoss@umich.edu
3. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Helsinki
maria.lasonen@helsinki.fi
4. Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
brian@weatherson.org
5. (teaching) James Tappenden, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
tappen@umich.edu