

# Daniel Drucker

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## Current position

Postdoctoral Fellow, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM

## Areas of specialization

Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, and Philosophy of Mind

## Areas of competence

Moral Psychology; Social Philosophy; Ancient Philosophy; Logic

## Education

- 2017 PhD in Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
*Dissertation*: “Attitudes Beyond Belief: A Theory of Rational Non-Doxastic Attitude Formation and Evaluation”  
*Committee*: Eric Swanson (chair), Sarah Moss, Brian Weatherson, and Ezra Keshet (linguistics)
- 2014 Visiting Student, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT
- 2013 Visiting Student, Arché, St Andrews
- 2011 AB (*hons.*) in Philosophy, University of Chicago

## Publications

- forthcoming “Policy Externalism”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, doi: [10.1111/phpr.12425](https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12425)  
“A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, doi: [10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024)  
“When Propriety Is Improper” (with Kevin Blackwell), *Philosophical Studies*, doi: [10.1007/s11098-017-1020-4](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1020-4)
- 2016 “Neo-Stoicism and What It Can Do”, *Ergo*, doi: [10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.021](https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.021)

## Under review

- A revise and resubmit on doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes  
A paper on desiring the good  
A paper on conversational ethics

## Honors and awards

- 2018 Honorable Mention, ProQuest Distinguished Dissertation Award  
*Selected by Michigan's philosophy department as the best dissertation of 2017, selected by the Michigan Society of Fellows for Honorable Mention*
- 2016–2017 Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship  
*University-wide competition including increased stipend and yearlong teaching release*
- 2016 Charles L. Stevenson Award  
*\$3,000 awarded to best dissertation proposal and chapter submitted that year*  
Weinberg Summer Dissertation Fellowship  
Rackham One-Term Fellowship  
Phi Kappa Phi
- 2013 Marshall M. Weinberg Summer Fellowship
- 2010 Phi Beta Kappa

## Talks

- 2018 “The Attitudes We Can Have”, Mini-conference on Epistemic Competence, University of Helsinki  
“The Duty to Present Opposed Reasons”, Humboldt Normativity Conference, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
“Plato’s General Theory of Non-Doxastic Attitudes”, Seminario de Investigación en Filosofía Antigua y su Recepción, UNAM  
“Decision-Theoretic Epistemology and Occasional Conversion”, Seminario de Investigadores, UNAM
- 2017 (with Kevin Blackwell) “When Propriety Is Improper”, Foundations of Belief and Decision-Making, Michigan
- 2016 “Conversational Goals and the Ethics of Conversation”, Michigan  
“Policy Externalism”, Michigan
- 2015 “Judging and Experience”, Michigan  
“Miners’ Puzzles and the Uses of Normative Language”, University of Pennsylvania
- 2014 “Inegalitarian Relativism”, Michigan Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop and MIT  
“There Are Good Things”, Princeton-Michigan Metaethics
- 2013 “Has Expressivism Made Good on Its Vindictory Ambitions?”, Princeton-Michigan Metaethics  
“How Satisfying Is Conventional Satisfaction?”, Michigan, International Plato Society

## Selected comments

- 2017 Casey Perin, “Why Socrates Fails to Refute Polus”, West Coast Plato Workshop, UC Davis  
Nate Charlow, “Decision-Theoretic Relativity in Deontic Modality”, Michigan Alumni Conference
- 2016 Ralph Wedgwood, “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic”, Ethics of Belief, Michigan
- 2015 Jeff C. King, “W(h)ither Semantics! (?)”, Theory of Meaning, Michigan
- 2013 Mandy Simons, “Projection as a Function of Information Structuring”, Michigan Linguistics and Philosophy Workshop

## Teaching

- UNAM*
- 2018 Epistemology and General Normativity (graduate)

	<i>University of Michigan</i>
2015	Human Nature (sole instructor) Philosophy and Narrative (sole instructor) Philosophical Problems (for Sarah Moss)
2014	Intermediate Symbolic Logic (for Jamie Tappenden)
2013	Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (for Matt Evans) Introductory Logic (for Gordon Belot)
2012	Law and Philosophy (for Elizabeth Anderson)

## Service to the profession

### REFEREEING

*Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Crítica, Debate Feminista, Episteme, Mind, Philosophers' Annual*

### CONFERENCE ORGANIZING

2017	First Annual Michigan Alumni Conference (with Zoë Johnson King) <i>With talks by Karen Bennett, Nate Charlow, Connie Rosati, Nishi Shah, and Holly Smith</i>
2016	Ethics of Belief (with Anna Edmonds), University of Michigan <i>With talks by Nomy Arpaly, Selim Berker, Miriam Schoenfeld, and Ralph Wedgwood</i>
2015	Theory of Meaning: Mathematics or Psychology? (with Boris Babic, Cat Saint-Croix, and Patrick Shirreff) <i>With talks by Elisabeth Camp, Jeff King, Florian Schwarz, and Zoltàn Gendler Szabò</i>

### GRADUATE SERVICE POSITIONS

2016–2017	MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) Facilitator
2015–2017	Organizer, Graduate Student Working Group
2013–2014	Graduate Representative to the Faculty
2012–2013	Social Chair

## Graduate courses<sup>1</sup>

2017	Applied Epistemology*	Sarah Moss
	Blame, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing*	Gabe Mendlow
2016	Responsibility and Respect*	Brian Weatherson
	Social and Political Philosophy of Language*	Eric Swanson
	Effective Altruism*	Hilary Greaves
2015	Philosophical Modeling*	Timothy Williamson
	Probabilistic Knowledge*	Sarah Moss
2014	Topics in Epistemology*	Timothy Williamson
	Metaethics* (MIT)	Justin Khoo and Jack Spencer
2013	Modal Logic as Metaphysics	Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Timothy Williamson
	Semantics Beyond Truth-Conditions	Sarah Moss
	Formal Methods*	Sarah Moss
	Expressivism*	Allan Gibbard
2012	Simplicity in Science and Metaphysics	Gordon Belot

<sup>1</sup> ‘\*’ indicates audit.

Independent Study: Epistemology of Understanding  
Mathematical Logic  
Hume's Epistemology  
Underdetermination in the Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics  
Skepticism  
Plato  
2011  
Proseminar in Metaphysics and Epistemology  
Rational Choice Theory  
Moral Psychology  
Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind  
Aristotle on Action Theory (Chicago)

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio  
Richmond Thomason  
Louis Loeb  
Eric Swanson  
Brian Weatherson  
Matt Evans  
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio  
James Joyce  
Peter Railton  
Victor Caston  
Agnes Callard

## Dissertation abstract

I present and explore a normative theory of non-doxastic attitudes like desire, hatred, and admiration. The viewpoint is general and abstract: independent of any particular flavor or source of normativity, I explore general features any acceptable way of forming these attitudes would have, especially in contrast to doxastic attitudes like belief. The first three chapters present a relatively unified picture of non-doxastic attitude formation, grounded in types of non-doxastic attitudes we can have in contrast to their impossible doxastic analogues. In particular, I first defend a kind of externalism, according to which the best updating policies to have for these attitudes will not essentially involve believing or being confident that some given circumstances obtain. I then apply it to a specific attitude, desire, to show how the approach works, especially to argue for a kind of moral rationalism to the effect that we are obligated to have certain desires simply because we are morally obligated to have them. Then based on a different aspect of the view, I present what I take to be some of the best ways to motivate the view, and some of the best ways to criticize it, as well. In the last chapter, I develop a theory about how these attitudes are best communicated, this time meant to capture how belief is best communicated, too, though it is inspired by certain features of non-doxastic attitudes.

You can read my dissertation on my website: <http://www.danieldrucker.org/research.html>.