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VERY ROUGH DRAFT

1   Introduction

Philosophy might have been constituted differently: topics from other disciplines could be incorporated or spun off,[1] e.g., and we could have different subfields than the ones we have. Why, for example, is there a large subfield that focuses specifically on reasonable and rational change in view, in belief—epistemology? (I bracket the large and important part that focuses on what knowledge is.) We might have easily had a subfield that focuses indifferently on the rational and reasonable change in *any* of our attitudes, for example relief, admiration, or desire. Perhaps that we *don't* divide things that way suggests there is something in the nature of how we might reasonably or rationally revise our beliefs that differs from how we might reasonably or rationally revise our other attitudes. I will argue against that suggestion, and thus defend a parity thesis: there is *one* activity we can and should undertake to do this, no matter the attitude, and no matter the kind of revision. That does not mean that the shape that activity will take is the same for belief and for the other attitudes; just that there is profit in focusing on the one activity as a whole.

Following relatively established philosophical use, I will call this activity *reasoning*.[2] But not every way we—philosophers, ordinary people, or also psychologists—use that word will correspond to my use. I have in mind the thing we do when we say or think the following:

(1)   Whatever broke into the store left these footprints. Those footprints are a bear's. The only bear around for a very long time comes from the local zoo. So whatever broke into the store was the bear from the local zoo.

But it pays to be more explicit here than that. To forestall confusion, I hereby stipulate that by **reasoning**, I mean that activity we ought to undertake when

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[1]   A personal favorite in this genre is Brian Weatherson's http://tar.weatherson.org/2012/07/18/what-could-leave-philosophy/.

[2] See, e.g., Boghossian (2003), Wedgwood (2006), Broome (2013), Staffel (2013), Valaris (2014, 2019), McHugh and Way (2018), and Dogramaci (2018), among many others.

we perceive a defect or deficiency in our attitudes, and when it is very important that we fix this defect or deficiency just by thinking or imagining. In characterizing my target this way, I take on a substantive commitment: there is some one such activity we ought to undertake in those circumstances. I find this plausible, but I cannot defend that commitment here in very much detail. You may read the rest of this paper as defending conditionals of the form 'if there is one such activity, then...'. Either way, I also avoid taking on a number of other, I think more contentious, commitments about the psychological properties of this activity, commitments often undertaken in order to provide an initial characterization of the target phenomenon. Is it, for example, "person-level"? There's something intuitive there, but the well-worked-out distinction does not readily make sense of what that is.[3] Is it conscious? Parts will be, but parts won't be: notice that (1), e.g., is clearly enthymematic, employing some suppressed premises. Is it slow? It need not be; nor need it be particularly effortful. For these reasons, I think it is both clearer and more accurate to stick with my normative characterization.[4]

It's also dialectically preferable to use my normative characterization rather than to assume some theoretically substantial account of what reasoning is. Were I instead to do that and then argue that given *that* account, we can reason to such-and-such change in attitude, that wouldn't carry much conviction, since pretty much all the accounts have serious problems and don't command general assent.

In my sense of 'reasoning', my parity thesis comes to this:

GENERALISM. Ordinary speakers of English can reason to any of the following changes in attitude:

- new all-out beliefs and new degrees of belief,[5]
- new lacks of belief,[6]
- new non-doxastic attitudes like admiration and relief,
- new lacks of non-doxastic attitudes,
- and acceptances of *attitudinal constraints*, commitments about properties one's overall attitudinal state can have.

So what I really have in mind is that reasoning is unified across different types of and changes in attitude in the sense that any of them may be the *outputs* of reasoning. Combined with my normative characterization, that suggests that there is one activity that underlies all the attitude repair we ought to do

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[3] See Drayson (2012).

[4] What about "type-2 reasoning"? Psychologists have done a lot of work in the last couple decades in dividing human cognition into a faster, more intuitive type and a slower, more taxing type. See, e.g., Evans and Stanovich (2013) for a very good relatively recent exploration of the type 1/type 2 distinction in psychology. Some philosophers, e.g., Boghossian (2014), say that our target is "type 1.5"; but I think this is a mistake. I think the distinction psychologists are after concerns processing, and not an activity in the strict sense at all.

[5] The latter of these won't be my focus here, but the arguments I give will extend very easily. See Harman (1986) for opposition, and Staffel (2013) and Dogramaci (2018) for defense.

[6] And perhaps to new suspension of judgment, though that's not my focus here.

when we notice defects or deficiencies. What *good* repair might look like will differ for the different sorts of revisions, but if I'm right, there is still one sort of activity there.

You'll notice, by the way, that it's tagged to English; this is no accident, since all of my examples are in English. I would be shocked if the essentials differed much between human languages, but the specific mechanisms might well vary.

One reason to care about GENERALISM is what I began with, that it pushes us to think of change in attitude as all one thing, and in my view it's philosophically important to do that that. Another reason is that there are prominent philosophers who have argued against it. For example, Broome (2013) argues that we cannot reason to lacks, i.e., abandon them "directly" through reasoning. If I'm right, such philosophers are wrong. And it matters whether they're wrong, too. Reasoning, you might think, is the *primary*, perhaps even the only, method by which we can repair the defects and deficiencies in our overall attitudinal states. Given that, then, whether we can reason to something will constrain what we can do, *sans phrase*; and if what we can do constrains what requirements, e.g., of rationality are normative for us,[7] then GENERALISM allows for the widest possible range of normative requirements to be normative for us.

If, for example, Broome is right that we cannot abandon our attitudes by reasoning, then consistency requirements' status is threatened. A consistency requirement might say, e.g., that we are rationally required not both to believe that p and to believe that $\neg p$. Suppose I find myself believing both p and $\neg p$. (We can make it a more complicated case of inconsistency if you prefer; this is just illustrative.) The only way for *me* rationally to comply with the requirement is to reason to the abandonment of one of these beliefs, but this Broome thinks I can't do. He does think automatic processes can rid me of one of them, but I can no more required to be the locus of automatic processes to rid myself of a contradictory belief than I can be to digest in a certain way. So my arguments here will rescue consistency requirements' genuine normative force for us, and that of more requirements besides.[8]

So hopefully though this is a relatively new question in the literature,[9] you can see why it's important and interesting. So how am I going to argue for it? Well, in the next section I'm going to defend a pretty minimal connection between reasoning (again, in my sense) and *argument*:

ARGUMENTALISM. We can reason to any change in attitude (or overall attitudinal state) that can be expressed by a speaker tokening in speech or thought the conclusion of a representation of an argument that we are *convinced* by.

The basic import of this principle should be clear, even if some of the terms in its formulation, especially 'expresses', stand in need of some clarification, which I'll give it in a little while.

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[7] See, e.g., Wedgwood (2013).

[8] Dietrich et al. (2019) noticed the way Broome's views interact in this way that's problematic for consistency requirements, too.

[9] McHugh and Way (2018) suggest we can reason to non-doxastic attitudes, but don't pursue the thought much at all.

Then I'll turn to examples that, combined with ARGUMENTALISM, deliver GENERALISM. Specifically, imagine the speaker in (1) then says or thinks:

(2)   Actually, there's a bear in the local circus, too. So whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo.

Continuing this same line of thought, she goes on:

(3)   That bear must have been enormous; if there had been people in here at the time, we could have had a lot of causalities. So my goodness were we *lucky*.

Then the (possibly internal) soliloquy stops with this:

(4)   It's tempting to be angry with the circus leader or zoo keeper, depending on which bear it was. But I know them both and know that they're good people—whatever happened must have been an accident. So I don't resent them *at all*.

Of course, to use ARGUMENTALISM and these examples, I need to argue that they express arguments—that's a big part of what I'll do. That, in turn, will require getting a lot clearer on what an argument even is, in the intended sense(s). That's where I'll begin in the next section. Then I'll come back to each of the examples, using them to argue for a different piece of GENERALISM. Finally, I'll close by outlining a problem for *eliminating* attitudes, especially non-doxastic ones. That's where the last part of GENERALISM will come in: to solve it, I'll use states of attitudinal constraint acceptance.

2   Reasoning and Argument

In this section, I will defend the rather minimal connection between argument and reasoning embodied in ARGUMENTALISM. I say "minimal" because, one, it is only a sufficient condition rather than necessary and sufficient, and two, because it is pretty heavily modalized. I stress that this is not because I believe some strengthening of ARGUMENTALISM won't be true, but rather, for my dialectical purposes, this will be all that I need. All the subarguments for GENERALISM will appeal to nothing stronger than this version of ARGUMENTALISM. Given, then, that the necessary-and-sufficient version of ARGUMENTALISM will turn on quite difficult questions in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, I won't try to defend that version, even though I suspect it is indeed true.[10] But much of this section will be devoted to getting clearer on some important terminology and distinctions.

ARGUMENTALISM said, remember, that we can reason to any change in attitude that can be expressed by the conclusion of an argument representation whose corresponding argument we are convinced by. So I'll start by making some distinctions in the way we can (and I think do) use the word 'argument'. There are three uses I have in mind; the distinctions I will make

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[10] For discussion, see, e.g., Carruthers (1998, 2015) for the *pro* view (essentially), and Machéry (2002) for some doubts.

are reminiscent of similar distinctions with typologically similar expressions like 'question'.[11] First, 'argument' can refer to a complex speech act, as in 'the argument took five minutes to go through'. I'll call this sort of speech act a **reasoned discourse**. Often it's composed somehow of assertions, but also commands ('suppose...'), and perhaps others still. An argument in this sense is intimately linked to *convincing* the addressee of some *conclusion* or conclusions *via* some *premises*: we argue in order to convince. Aiming to convince is not the same thing as aiming to be believed; I'll say more about the difference soon. The important thing for now is just to get a fix on what reasoned discourses are.

Here's a simple example of what, when uttered, would normally constitute a reasoned discourse:

(5)   If it's raining, the streets are wet. It is raining. So, the streets are wet.

It helps to have a comparison with assertion in mind. Assertions, at least on the standard picture, communicate pieces of information called propositions, semantic objects. That is, an assertion that p communicates the proposition that p. The second way we can use 'argument' is to talk about an analogue of this semantic object, the things *reasoned discourses* communicate. I will reserve the term '**argument**', *simpliciter*, for this semantic object. What, then, do reasoned discourses communicate? Well, first, since they're composed of other speech acts like assertions, they will in part communicate propositions. But these propositions are only part of what they really communicate, in my opinion, namely dependency structures. Take (5): the contents <if it's raining, the streets are wet>, <it's raining>, <the streets are wet> and <the streets are wet> are communicated, along with the dependence of <the streets are wet> on the first two propositions and on some rule, which we can say is *modus ponens*. This is different from a mere *list* of propositions, which would have been communicated by (without any "inference intonation"):

(5′)   If it's raining, the streets are wet. It is raining. The streets are wet.

(5) and (5′) are of course very different, though, in what they communicate. That is part of why I say (5), as a whole, communicates a dependency structure.

This isn't the only possible way of analyzing the difference between (5) and (5′). It might be that the discourse as a whole merely *presupposes* that that the streets are wet follows from the other premises.[12] That accounts for a lot of the narrowly linguistic data. So why do I say what I say? Simply because, as the essential effect or aim of an assertion is to get the content to be believed (or added to the common ground, if you prefer[13]), the essential effect or aim of a reasoned discourse like (5) is to get one's interlocutors to have the belief that the streets are wet *with a certain basis*. That is, *accepting* the argument would, if all goes well psychologically for the addressees, lead to that belief with that basis. That is different from just assertions. And the presupposition account cannot account for that.

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[11] See, e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof (2011).

[12] See, e.g., Pavese (2017) for a dynamic implementation.

[13] See of course Stalnaker (1978).

Of course, it is quite contentious what a basis is, or how exactly they work.[14] Yet that attitudinal changes *have* a basis—a particular kind of *reason for which*—is, I think, completely indispensable to our idea of the attitudes at all. I won't go in for any particular account; my hope is that our intuitions are robust enough about all the cases of interest here that I won't need to.

So, if we are to retain the analogy between assertion and reasoned discourse, we should say that the semantic objects communicated by reasoned discourses in cases like (5) are sets of propositions structured by dependency relations. What would a "dependency relation" amount to? Well, in (5) it's plausible that it's *modus ponens.* More generally, where the reasoned discourse puts forward some proposition as to be believed on the given basis, I will assume that the relation amounts to being epistemically licensed or warranted by a given epistemic rule. That might in other cases be, e.g., rules of enumerative induction, analogical rules, etc. I mean to leave things quite flexible on this score.[15]

To introduce a few more terms, I need to get into the details just a bit more on dependency relations. I will represent them as *functions D* from the set of semantic objects that partly compose the argument to the other semantic objects that they depend on, along with whatever rules back the dependency. An argument's **premises** will be those semantic objects o such that $D(o) = \{\emptyset, \emptyset\}$. An argument's **conclusions** will be any objects o such that $D(o) \neq \{\emptyset, \emptyset\}$. An argument's **principal conclusions** will be any conclusions o such that there is no other conclusion o' such that $D(o') = \{O, R\}$ (O a set of semantic objects in the argument, R a set of rules used in the argument), such that $o \in O$. Thus, $D_{(5)}(<$the streets are wet$>) = \{\{<$if it's raining, the streets are wet$>, <$it's raining$>\}$, *modus ponens*$\}$. Having introduced the function notation, I will use it again very infrequently; but I will be using the terms 'premise' and 'conclusion', and you should have in mind how I've defined them here.

To generalize this, we should say that dependency structures are objects-to-be-A-ed, along with the dependency relations that make them warranted, fitting, etc. objects to be A-ed. I'll return to this much more in later sections, but it's important for now just to understand that the idea of an argument (in the semantic sense) has to be generalized, both for my purposes and just for generally good philosophical reason.

The third way we use 'argument' is to mean the sentences we use making our reasoned discourses; I'll call these **argument representations**. They aren't syntactically marked, of course, like they are for assertions and declarative sentences on the one hand and questions and interrogative ones on the other. But it's still handy to have a way to refer to them.

So those are the relevant ways we use the term 'argument'. I said I'd also clarify what I mean by 'express' there, and that's what I'll do now. Before getting too deep into that, though, it's worth stressing that we really do have a pre-theoretic idea of roughly what I intend by the term. This is somewhat

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[14] Important works: Davidson (1963), Thomson (1967), Winters (1983), Korcz (2000), Sosa (2015), and Neta (2019).

[15] See Boghossian (2008) for a good discussion of the epistemic rules framework.

contentious,[16] but at the very least I'll try to *explicate* the everyday concept.

That said, an explication of 'express' in the intended sense should make sense of the following data points. First, literal, purportedly sincere utterances of declarative sentences σ express the speaker's (purported) belief that σ.[17] Second, 'yuck!' said of or in response to some food expresses the speaker's disgust at the food. Third, and this is a bit more negotiable, $\ulcorner$I A that p (or o)$\urcorner$ *reports* but does not, or anyway need not, *express* the speaker's A-ing that p (or o); it *expresses* that belief that the speaker As that p (or o). Thus, 'I believe that the streets are wet' reports the speaker's belief about the streets, but 'the streets are wet' doesn't. This distinction is philosophically important in the metaethical tradition stemming from Ayer (1936), for short 'non-cognitivism'. It will also be important for my work here, but in a different way, so I'll spend a bit more time drawing the distinction.

I'll skip some of the natural but hopeless attempts to explicate the distinction.[18] When S **expresses** an attitude A with a (possibly purely internal) utterance u of a sentence σ in a context c just when the rules of σ's language entail that S's utterance of u is *insincere* when S knows their utterance of u in c isn't sufficiently proximately caused by S's utterance of u.[19]

That a language's grammar can determine sincerity conditions is a substantive commitment, but I think broadly defensible. It really does seem to be that competence with English declarative sentences requires this implicit knowledge, e.g. (I'll consider other constructions in a bit.) So the only relatively unfamiliar aspect of this explication is the "sufficient proximateness" condition. I add it to account for examples like this:

(6)   That damn Kaplan got promoted!

An utterance of (6) typically expresses (but does not report) the speaker's hostility to Kaplan.[20] It differs in its expressive properties, I think, from:

(7)   I am hostile to Kaplan.

(7), I think, reports but need not, depending on the prosody of the utterance, express the hostility. The difference between (6) and (7) seems to me to be not that the one requires hostility to Kaplan but the other doesn't in order to be sincere, but rather that the one requires that the hostility be a direct enough cause of the utterance but the other doesn't. If I know of myself that I'm broadly hostile to Kaplan but not "feeling it" at the moment, I am sincere

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[16] Schroeder (2008a,b), whose account mine will resemble, expresses some skepticism on this score—too much skepticism, I think.

[17] I hear $\ulcorner\sigma$ expresses $A\urcorner$ as entailing that A exists, i.e., that the speaker has A. Hence the 'purported's. If you don't have this same worry, you can ignore this.

[18] See Schroeder (2008b) for a good run-through.

[19] The closest antecedents of this are, I think, Alston (1967) and Schroeder (2008a,b). But my account differs from theirs in some ways, most important being first, the "sufficient proximateness" condition, and second the "knowledge" condition. I'll discuss why I have the first in a moment, but as to the second, it's to avoid problems involving self-knowledge failures, as discussed in, e.g., Ridge (2006), Chan and Kahane (2011), and Stokke (2014). If you wish to remove the knowledge condition, that's fine by me; nothing I say will be much affected by it.

[20] For this example, and the thought that it expresses hostility, see the charmingly self-deprecating Kaplan (2008).

when I utter (7) but not, it seems to me, when I utter (6). That's why I add the sufficient proximateness condition.

I can be a bit quicker with reporting. S's utterance that p **reports** a given attitudinal state A just when p entails that S has A and p is about A. The specifics of this account will depend, of course, on what it is for an utterance that p to be about something.[21] But what's nicest about this way of understanding the reporting/expressing distinction this way is that it sorts the examples correctly—that is, intuitively—without entailing in a stipulative way that no instance of reporting A is an instance of expressing A. I'll address some difficult cases in a moment, though.

That's enough for the preliminaries. I want now to defend ARGUMENTAL-ISM, the view that we can reason to any change in attitude expressed by the representation of an argument we can be convinced by. Why believe it? Well, very often I think an episode of reasoning *just is* being convinced by an argument. To see this, first, consider the phenomenology of (1): reasoning *feels like* making this argument to yourself and being convinced by it. Often these two things are separated, since we make arguments to others; but sometimes we make arguments to ourselves, and we even accept those arguments and are convinced by them. At least some paradigmatic episodes of reasoning are like that, I claim.

This shouldn't be very surprising. The view that the evolutionary function of reasoning—roughly, what reasoning was selected for and sustains our ability to do it over time—is the production and evaluation of arguments has recently become very popular in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science.[22] If this is right, we'd expect there to be an intimate connection between reasoning and argumentation; and one of the most intimate connections is (at least occasional) token event identity.[23] So the phenomenological argument, that at least often there just doesn't feel like there's a difference between reasoning and being convinced by an argument you make to yourself, is bolstered by the fact that recent evolutionary psychology and cognitive psychology leads us to expect exactly this sort of connection.

Of course, token event identity is not the only possible relation that would respect an intimate connection between reasoning and argumentation, and perhaps even the phenomenology. Perhaps, e.g., there is some kind of cor-relation with a common cause. Even that, though, would be sufficient for ARGUMENTALISM, since it really is a very weak thesis.

Since it's so weak, most of the work arguing for GENERALISM will be in finding reasoned discourses with the required properties: that they com-municate arguments with argument representations with the right expressive properties. I'll begin that work in the next section. But to do so, I'll first say why some philosophers—especially John Broome—have been pessimistic that what I'm trying to do in this paper can be done. His challenge will provide a

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[21] For what seems to be the orthodoxy now, see Yablo (2014).

[22] See especially Mercier and Sperber (2011), but for a progenitor concerned with specif-ically moral reasoning, see, e.g., Haidt (2001).

[23] As I said at the beginning of this section, ARGUMENTALISM is weak—only a sufficient condition, and doubly modalized. We'd get a necessary and sufficient condition if I went in for *type* identity here rather than just for token identity. But that's a much more difficult claim to argue for, and so I postpone it to other work.

useful framework for the constructive work I aim to do.

But just to recap for now. I distinguished three senses of 'argument': reasoned discourses, complex speech acts aimed at convincing; arguments, the semantic objects conveyed by such speech acts, structured by dependency relations; and argument representations, the sentences that express the relevant contents. Then I argued that reasoning and argument are intimately connected, both in terms of their phenomenology and in terms of reasoning's evolutionary function. Then I explicated the ordinary distinction between expressing and reporting, and finally I argued for ARGUMENTALISM as the simplest sort of principle that would underwrite the possibility of changing our minds in reasoning episodes like (1) and (5).

3 Broome's Challenge and Reasoning to a Lack

So, first to Broome's challenge, and then to answering it.

Broome's challenge is this. Broome asks us to consider what explicit reasoning to a lack would look like; he produces the following:

(8)   The climate is warming. So, I don't believe the climate is not warming.

The problem, according to Broome, is that this is *bad* reasoning, and thus not the sort of reasoning that could underlie reasonable belief elimination. But if it's not episodes like (8) that could underlie reasonable belief elimination, no other possibilities come to mind, and thus (he tentatively concludes) there *aren't* other possibilities. Thus we cannot reason to a lack of belief.

We have the resources to explain in more detail what Broome's problem might be. I think he's implicitly assuming something like ARGUMENTALISM, or perhaps a strengthened biconditional version. The other thought here is that if *anything* would underwrite explicit reasoning to a lack of belief, it would be being convinced by some argument expressed by an argument representation whose conclusion expressed the new change. But (8) *expresses* the belief that the agent *doesn't believe* that the climate isn't warming, not the lack of belief itself.[24] In our terminology, it merely reports the lack of belief. But reporting without expressing will generate bad arguments in these contexts. Using $\ulcorner Bp \urcorner$, etc. to mean $\ulcorner$I believe that $p\urcorner$, etc.:

P1. p.

C1. $\therefore Bp$.

P2. $\neg p$.

C2. $\therefore \neg B \neg p$.

These are really bad argument schemata, at least when they're not enthymematic! And if they are enthymematic, it doesn't seem that they can secure the *change* want. Suppose, e.g., we add to the second argument:

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[24] Broome (2013, page 279) emphasizes this point.

P3. For all p such that ϕ, $Bp \supset \neg B\neg p$,

where $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ stands for some appropriate restriction on the quantifier. But this premise would be true independent of any reasoning, if at all, and so presupposes a change and cannot give rise to it. So it's no help; the unmodified argument would be as good in the present circumstances as that one. But whatever underlies rational reasoning toward a lack of belief wouldn't be a *bad* argument. So, we can't reason to a lack. This is what I will call **Broome's problem**. In a slogan, it's that the conclusion's merely reporting a lack of belief is not enough. We must, according to Broome, let "automatic processes" take over for us in eliminating our beliefs.

Really, it's a challenge: can we find a better sort of argument to do the job than (8)? And it seems to me clear that we can, though we have to look outside the usual "descriptive" vocabulary to see how. In fact I've already given one example, (2) (repeated here):

(2)   Actually, there's a bear in the local circus, too. So whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo.

The second sentence, I claim, expresses but likely does not report that the speaker doesn't believe that whatever broke into the store came from the local zoo. To see this, suppose that the agent knows that they believe that whatever broke into the store *did* come from the local zoo; then they would *ipso facto* be insincere, and moreover I think this is true as a matter of conventional fact about 'not necessarily' (and thus hopefully 'not' and 'necessarily').[25]

More generally, items of "epistemic vocabulary" express, I think as a matter of convention, more complex doxastic states than mere belief and disbelief.[26] $\ulcorner$It's more than 75% likely that $p\urcorner$, for example, seems to express a greater than 75% degree of confidence that p. Other examples will be expressions like 'probably', 'might', 'must', and 'possible'. I said that I thought 'not necessarily' "likely" doesn't report the speaker's non-belief. On my explication of reporting, this depends on one assumption about how epistemic vocabulary works. Take the following:

(9)   Trump probably won't win reelection.

My assumption is just that, whatever the truth conditions are, the sentence is not *about* some relevant information state (e.g., the speaker's beliefs, or the common ground, or whatever) in the way 'Russell is smart' is about Russell. I make this assumption simply because it seems that (9) doesn't report any mental states (even collective ones), and the definition of 'reporting' I gave requires aboutness. Many will find this plausible, especially expressivists.[27] But I think even contextualists, those who think, roughly, that (e.g.,) $\ulcorner$might $p\urcorner$ is true iff p is compatible with the relevant body of information,[28] should

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[25] It's tougher to come up with cases where the agent merely knows "intellectually" that they don't believe that whatever the bear comes from the local zoo, but that that's not a relatively proximate cause of their utterance. It's easier to come up with these for the other attitudes, and so I focus on them more there. Still, it's important to mark.

[26] For lines congenial to this, see, e.g., Swanson (2011), Yalcin (2007), Rothschild (2012), and Moss (2015).

[27] Yalcin (2011) cites this as a motivation and desideratum for expressivism.

[28] See, e.g., Kratzer (2008), DeRose (1991), Dowell (2011), von Fintel and Gillies (2008), and Mandelkern (2019) for versions of different levels of sophistication.

want that result if they can get it; it's to my mind an interesting open question whether they can get it.

Anyway, it wouldn't be so bad for me if someone saying the second sentence of (2) would both express and report their lack of belief. That's because, first, by ARGUMENTALISM, they would still be reasoning to a lack. And second, for any *plausible* contextualist account, the argument would not be as bad as Broome's (8) was. Take, e.g., an account according to which ⌜not necessarily p⌝ is true just when it's compatible with the information the relevant people (perhaps just the agent themselves) is taking for granted after the utterance has been made.[29] The argument will be good, since, by ARGUMENTALISM, the reasoning will *make* that conclusion true, at least if all goes well. In that way, the argument would be like:

P4. p.

C3. ∴ I said [or thought] that p.

Intuitively that's a good argument, though of course in no way deductively valid, at least not without further suppressed premises. So, even if my assumption about aboutness for utterances involving epistemic vocabulary is wrong, there's still a way to avoid Broome's problem for reasoning to a lack of belief.

Or that's what I want to say. In responding to Broome in this way, I have been assuming that (2) expresses an argument. But does it?

Well, how can we *tell* whether something expresses an argument? This is an important general question, and one that I think it would do philosophers (and semanticists and formal pragmaticists) well to work out more. One indication is that the final sentence of the representation will have 'so', and this can be replaced with other discourse particles like 'hence', 'therefore', and even 'ergo'.[30] (2) obviously has 'so' in the appropriate position, and we can also make the relevant substitutions:

(10)   a. ... Therefore, whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo.

   b. ... Hence, whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo.

   c. ... Ergo, whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo.

That's one strong piece of evidence.

The other, perhaps more important piece of evidence is that someone who was *convinced* by what the speaker says would thereby have a lack of belief that whatever broke into the store didn't necessarily come from the local zoo *with the relevant basis*. Typically we talk much more about bases when it comes to beliefs themselves, rather than the lack of them. But the lack here will have a basis, and that basis is, roughly, that a different bear, one that didn't come from the local zoo, might have broken into the store instead of the bear from the local zoo. We may also have an entailment roughly like:

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[29] This is roughly Mandelkern's account, abstracting away many, many details.
[30] See, e.g., Pavese (2019).

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(†). {<it might be that the F = the G>, <it might be that the H = the G>, <the $F \neq$ the H>} ⊨ <the F isn't necessarily the G>.[31]

I'll return to this (possible) entailment in the next section, but for now it's enough that there does seem to be one, or something similar.

So, given these two further facts, I think we have strong reason to call (2) an argument. Thus by Argumentalism, we can reason to a lack of belief. We were able to solve Broome's problem by looking at a wider variety of English-language expression than he had done, and by being more explicit about when we can reason to a given change in attitude. And, as a consequence, we've saved consistency requirements of the kind I mentioned in the introduction.

That, then, is the first part of Generalism. And I suspect it will be the least controversial part of it, since it seems so clear that we *do* reason to lacks of belief. In the next section, though, I'll turn to a much more controversial claim, namely that we can reason to new non-doxastic attitudes like relief. The form of the argument will be very similar to the form of the argument in this section, but it will take us to very different expressions than the ones I considered here.

4   Reasoning to Relief

In the first subsection, I'll present the argument that we can reason to relief. In the second, I'll respond to some important objections to that argument.

4.1   The Argument

As I said, here I'll argue we can reason to relief. In displaying an episode of reasoning to relief, it's natural to come up with something like:

(11)   That bear must have been enormous; if there had been people in here at the time, we could have had a lot of causalities. So I'm really relieved [that no one was hurt].

But (11) reports—perhaps also expresses, but definitely reports—the speaker's relief. So perhaps (11) would be a *bad* argument, and not what would really underwrite the rational or reasonable acquisition of belief. In that way, it would be like Broome's (8) was.

But of course (11) was not the example I began with; the one I gave was:

(3)   That bear must have been enormous; if there had been people in here at the time, we could have had a lot of causalities. So my goodness were we *lucky*.

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[31] We have to be careful here. On most extant semantics, this entailment will hold. (In addition to those already cited, see dynamic semantic accounts of 'might' like Veltman (1996) and Willer (2013).) But most extant semantics have it that ⌜might p⌝ is true when p is *compatible* with some given information state. Depending on exactly what that information state is, to get the expression facts to come out right, we may need stronger lexical entries than this. (Mere probabilistic compatibility, e.g., might not get us what we want, at least if ⌜S believes that p⌝ doesn't entail ⌜S has maximal confidence that p⌝.) But if the information state is just *doxastic* compatibility, then we'd be golden.

This doesn't have that same problem. It expresses but definitely doesn't report the speaker's relief.

To see why it expresses the relief, I want to stress that the stress is important. (The 'my goodness' does help, too.) Intonation contours, that is, I think are—as a matter of the rules of language—associated with certain attitudes, relief among them.[32] To see this, imagine someone who says (3) with the relevant intonation contours, but then adds:

(12) But I am in no way relieved about it.

They'd be hard to understand, just like someone who said the following Moore-paradoxical utterance would be:

(13) The streets are wet, but I don't believe that.

It's controversial what the right explanation of that unintelligibility is. But a failure of sincerity does seem a likely part of the explanation.[33] The point for now is just that someone who speaks as the person in (3) does but knows they don't feel relieved abuses the language, since English really does seem to associate with that kind of utterance the attitude of relief.

And here, there is no worry at all that it also reports the relief. (3) is in no way *about* the relevant agent's relief, neither in an intuitive sense nor in any of the philosophically-developed senses.

If that's right, then to apply ARGUMENTALISM, I only need to argue that (3) is a reasoned discourse that communicates an argument someone can be convinced by. So we should once again check whether the criteria from the previous section are satisfied.

(3) does use 'so' in the right spot. And the following can work:

(14) ...Hence [/Therefore], my goodness were we *lucky.*

I should say some people have found 'hence' and 'therefore' just a bit odd. But I think saying them in the right way tends to satisfy people. That said, there's a different response to this kind of data. "Expressives" tend to scope out of embdedded environments:

(15) If that damn Kaplan gets promoted, this place will go to the dogs.

Though the expressive 'damn' is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, the hostility expressed is unconditional, the same as with (6).[34] And so you may think that the argument marked by 'so', etc., doesn't include the expressive component at all, however that's to be understood (on which more in a moment), but just essentially that "we" [the speaker and her companions] were lucky. But that wouldn't be the right kind of argument for what I need.

The response to this worry is that, sometimes, we *only* have an expressive, without any "descriptive" material for the 'so' to license or target. So consider, e.g.:

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[32] Not everyone will agree with me; famously Bolinger (1989) thought the connection between emotion and intonation was natural, not grammatical. But see Ladd (1990), among many others, for a compelling response that languages vary along this dimension.

[33] For one influential account that centers sincerity, see Heal (1994).

[34] See, e.g., Potts (2007) for more.

(16) It'd be terrible if she's not going to come. But if she were going to
      come, she'd be here by now. So, shit.

Here there's no descriptive material for the 'so' (etc.) to license or target. So
the response under consideration here won't work in general.[35] (I'll consider
different examples in the next section that make a similar point, bolstering
this response here.)

So, (3) passes that test. The more important test, though, was whether
a person can be *convinced* by (3) and thereby come to have relief with the
appropriate basis. And it seems to me that this very much *can* happen in
the ordinary cases in which (3) might be uttered. That is, suppose one of our
protagonist's friends hears them say (3) and says:

(17) Yeah, that's completely right, actually.

We would expect the speaker to have the same sort of relief the speaker ex-
pressed, and on the same basis. And we'd expect that because they seem
convinced by the argument. That is, there doesn't seem to be any impor-
tant difference between someone who says (17) in response to (3) and thereby
comes to have the relevant appropriately-based relief, and someone who says
(17) in response to (1) and thereby comes to have the relevant appropriately-
based *belief*. The only difference is in the attitude-type itself that's involved;
everything else seems relevantly identical. This, I think, is a powerful reason
to count (3) as an argument.

If that's right, then by ARGUMENTALISM, we can reason to new states of
relief. There is, then, parity between belief and relief in this regard: we can
reason to both. But I think many will be dissatisfied by what I say here. So
in the next subsection I'll respond to some of the most important objections.

4.2 Objections

Here I'll present those objections. Especially the first will be important for
more fully fleshing out the view I'm defending here, but for the others, mostly
the ones that don't grip you can be skimmed without loss.

OBJECTION 1. In defending reasoning to a lack, I gave an *entailment* that
backed the reasoning, (†). Entailments are backed by relations between *propo-
sitional contents*; but there won't be any such relations at work in warranting
the new relief. So whatever is going on, it's not argument, which requires
relations between *propositional contents*.[36]

RESPONSE. The basic response is that this objection takes propositional
reasoning too seriously as its paradigm. True, I think you can think of (†)
as an entailment, underwritten by, perhaps, an inclusion relation among the

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[35] Perhaps some other account of the use of 'so' will work here, a non-argumentative
one. For example, it might be a metalinguistic explanation: 'so, I am saying 'shit''. But
of course this can be an internal utterance. Perhaps there are still other possibilities, but
hopefully this will be enough to have considered for now.

[36] See again Broome (2013) for this sort of thought, though not put this way. And thanks
to Joel Velasco for the objection.

contents expressed by the relevant sentences.[37] But we know that this isn't the only way an argument can be good, and thus not the only way to get the right sort of convincing.

Consider, e.g., imperative inference:

P6. Go to your room and wait for me.

C5. ∴ (So,) Go to your room.

This seems like a good argument, indeed roughly as good as one using *modus ponens*, insofar as we have a good grasp on what the good arguments are. Perhaps it's backed by an "entailment" $\{!p \wedge !q\} \vDash !p$ (where $\ulcorner !p \urcorner$ means $\ulcorner$make it the case that $p!\urcorner$). Next consider:

P7. If you know this stuff, help me!

P8. You do know this stuff.

C6. ∴ (So,) Help me!

Once again, this seems like a good argument. And it seems to me that once we accept the goodness of P6–C5, we should also recognize the goodness of P7–C6. But it's notoriously hard to understand the goodness of arguments with imperative conclusions as somehow relating contents, since C5 doesn't seem to have as its semantic value a proposition, and P7–P8 and C6 don't even seem to have the same *type* of semantic value.[38] If that's right, then the objector would be committed to thinking that not even being *deductively valid* can guarantee that some apparent reasoned discourse really does communicate an argument (in my intended sense), and thus that some deductively valid apparent argument representations can't really underlie reasoning. That's a very bad thing to commit to.

We need a better model of what's involved in argument, so that we don't have to say that every good argument has to involve a relation between propositional contents. What, then, do all the good arguments we've encountered so far—bracketing (3) for now—have in common? A good argument takes premises and a good rule and outputs something that, given the premises and the rule, is fitting to be A-ed. We've seen how that works with (1) and (5): the premises, possibly supplemented with suppressed ones, entail that the conclusion is true, and thus fitting to be believed. With (2), we might proceed on the same basis, and say sentences of the form $\ulcorner$the F isn't necessarily the $G\urcorner$

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[37] As I said in footnote 30, the details might get fussy. But see Bledin (2014) for one especially natural way of thinking of this entailment as logically valid; specifically, $<$the F isn't necessarily the $G>$ will be an *informational consequence* of the premises, i.e., roughly, an information state can't have the structure required by the premises without thereby having the structure required by the conclusion. But for this to work for me, the information state likely needs to be something like "states not ruled out by the agent's beliefs". I'll return to the "entailment" in the main text just below.

[38] In fairness, there are those who say that imperatives do have propositional semantic values, e.g., Schwager (2012), who interprets imperatives as having essentially modal semantic values. But I think this analysis is not the orthodoxy now, and suffers problems exactly in virtue of this commitment (why, e.g., can imperatives not be true?) See, e.g., Charlow (2014) for discussion.

express ordinary propositions. Then the last sentence of (2) would express a proposition entailed by (2)'s premises. But we also might not, and instead say that the argument really works this way: given the premises and a rule for *lack of belief*, the argument presents 'the bear that broke into the store is from the local zoo' as fitting not to be believed. This way of doing things would be less committal, since non-propositionalism is a live and popular option in the semantics of epistemic modals.[39] So, at least if we wish to be neutral among otherwise-live options in the semantics of epistemic modals, we don't even need imperative arguments to see the need to generalize the notion of a good argument past operations on propositional contents.

Thus, my generalized notion is this: a **general argument** is a set of content–attitude pairs, where contents can be but need not be propositions— more generally, they can be objects of any kind, properties, actions, etc.— along with dependency relations, defined (or represented) now as functions from content-attitude pairs to the content–attitude, rule pairs that might make such content-attitude pairs warranted or fitting. The definitions of 'premise' and 'conclusion' are straightforward adaptations given this.

Even given this general concept of an argument, there will be remaining controversies about just how to understand imperatival arguments like from P6 to C5. Do accepted imperatives update preferences,[40] for example, or do they update plans?[41] It's not for me to say here. My point here is minimal. First, P6–C5 and P7–C6 seem deductively valid, and thus really seem like they express arguments. So we need a generalized notion of argument, since it seems that we cannot understand those arguments as just relations between propositional contents. And second, such arguments seem to underwrite good reasoning; thus there is no in-principle barrier to, e.g., (3) doing the same. Objection 1 fails.

OBJECTION 2. But what, then, is the rule? In other cases, it's pretty easy to say: *modus ponens* (or some epistemic permission built on top of the inference rule). What is it with (3), though?

RESPONSE. In (3), it seems like a rule permitting one to transition from 'such-and-such horrible thing nearly happened but didn't' to relief would be the relevant rule. That's nothing like a deductive rule, but of course that's not how we should ultimately expect fittingness-transmitting rules to work. It's because of too narrow a focus on deductive, non-enthymematic propositional argument that we expect that of our rules. Of course, it will be a highly substantive task to say what the good fittingness-transmitting rules are for all the various attitudes, just as it's a highly substantive task to do so in epistemology. But I can't see a reason for more in-principle pessimism about

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[39] See again the references in footnote 26, and also Charlow (forthcoming). Finally dynamic views probably fit in here, too.

[40] See, e.g., Condoravdi and Lauer (2011) and Starr (forthcoming).

[41] See, e.g., Charlow (2014), inspired by Gibbard (2003).

it for attitudes like relief, admiration, or resentment than for belief.[42]

OBJECTION 3. Someone might accept (3), it seems, and still not feel relief. But that seems impossible for (1) and (5) and belief.[43]

RESPONSE. I'll be quicker with this objection. It is of course true that we can recognize that some emotion, say relief, would be reasonable and yet we not feel it. That, I think, is the situation the objector has in mind. But this also happens with belief. After being given a statistical argument about the relative safety of cars and planes, I might say the reasoning is good but not really believe it. We can think an argument is a good one without thereby changing our mind. But this is as true of belief as of any other attitude.

The important point is this: if one accepts the argument communicated by (3) but does not feel relief with the appropriate basis, one is, perhaps, akratic: one's non-relief is "recalcitrant", as it's sometimes put.[44] But that's exactly true also of someone who accepts the argument in (1) or (5) but does not form the relevant beliefs; in that situation, one is epistemically or doxastically akratic.[45] Thus there is still no significant difference here between belief and non-doxastic attitudes like relief.

OBJECTION 4. Perhaps the conclusion of the reasoning is just the belief, namely that the agent themselves ought or at least may feel relief in the circumstances, or something like that; then we'd also say that automatic processes then somehow transform into relief. Then we would not have reasoning to relief.[46]

RESPONSE. I understand the temptation to say that here, but my response is very simple. We don't say that in the belief case; indeed, if we did, we'd have an infinite regress on our hands, unless ⌜we ought to believe that p⌝-type beliefs are the only ones we could form without this intermediary. So we know that changes in attitude can happen without them. So then positing them here looks incredibly *ad hoc*; why do we need them here, where didn't in other places, besides to resist the conclusion I've been arguing for in this section? Perhaps there's some answer an advocate of this objection could think of, but I couldn't think of anything plausible myself.

Those are the objections to the conclusion of this section that I'll consider. Given that none of them have worked, going forward I'll assume that my argument is right, and thus that we can indeed reason to relief. I won't argue here for similar conclusions with, e.g., admiration or hatred, but it shouldn't be too hard to see how they'd go.

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[42] One possibility is that you accept a kind of Humeanism about the attitudes, that they can't, themselves be rational or reasonable, nor can their formation. I am assuming the negation of that view in this paper, since arguing against it directly would be a really large task, so big that it deserves a different paper. So, again, you may interpret much of what I say as conditional on that kind of Humeanism's falsity. That said, I take the apparent reasoned discourses like (3) to be in pretty direct tension with that kind of Humeanism.

[43] Thanks to Julia Driver and Ian Proops for this objection

[44] See, e.g., Greenspan (1988) and D'Arms and Jacobson (2003).

[45] See Scanlon (1998) for an early discussion of this phenomenon.

[46] Thanks to Josh Dever here.

5 A Problem for Eliminating Non-Doxastic Attitudes

I have argued by ARGUMENTALISM that we can reason to a wide variety of changes in attitude: new beliefs, new lacks of belief, and relief. I hope to have also given a template for how to add to these: just find apparent reasoned discourses that express other states of mind. Doing this, I think we'd be able to extend the conclusion to cover new states of admiration, desires, degrees of belief, etc. And similarly, you might expect that it'd be easy to motivate the idea that we can eliminate non-doxastic attitudes, just as we could eliminate doxastic ones. In this section, I want to present a challenge for the view that we can *reliably* reason to eliminate non-doxastic attitudes. This, I think, is a problem for everyone, but which I think hasn't been sufficiently noticed. Then in the next section I want to solve that problem, in part by introducing a different class of attitude, states of attitudinal constraint acceptance.

To see the problem, consider (4) again:

(4)   It's tempting to be angry with the circus leader or zoo keeper, depending on which bear it was. But I know them both and know that they're good people—whatever happened must have been an accident. So I don't resent them *at all*.

Now, by our criterion, this ends with a *report* of the speaker's lack of resentment toward the two people, not an expression. So this by itself wouldn't show that reasoning to a lack of resentment of the relevant people is possible. Bracket that—we should want such an unexceptionable monologue to be reliably true; it might be tricky to find the reasoning that makes it that way, but that won't be my focus now.

Imagine the same person who said (4) (i.e., the same person who said (1)–(3), too) also said the following:

(18)   Our mayor is unbelievably corrupt, and we could've seen that beforehand. I resent whoever voted for him!

I'll lastly just stipulate that both the zookeeper and the circus leader voted for the mayor. But (4) and (18) are inconsistent with that (completely ordinary, given the circumstances) stipulation. Hence, a puzzle!

You may not see it yet, so I need to be clear about the assumptions that generate it. The crucial bit is the second sentence of (18). So, what does 'whoever' mean? Well, the consequence I need is very easy to see in some cases. Consider the following:

(19)   Whoever is behind me kicking my seat is a jerk.

(19) entails that if it's my mother behind me kicking my seat, my mother is a jerk. Similarly, if I say:

(20)   I'm angry with whoever is behind me kicking my seat.

Once again, I think we should say the same thing: if it's my mother behind me kicking my seat, I'm angry with my mother. This is pretty unexceptional, I think. So I claim (18) entails:

(21) [every x: VOTED-FOR(x, mayor)][RESENT(me, x)]

How exactly that happens depends on what we say free relative 'wh'-'ever' phrases mean. I think it's most likely they're plural definite descriptions, perhaps with derivable ignorance presuppositions, but maybe they're universal quantifiers (with the same presuppositions). Either way the entailment seems to follow.[47]

(21) entails that the speaker resents the zookeeper and circus leader, contradicting (4). Nothing was all that special about the particular clash I set up, though; it's easy to vary the types of attitudes and properties involved and get other such collisions. Here's a statement of the problem:

> ACCESS PROBLEM. Often we bear A to whatever is F, where we don't have an exhaustive list of all and only Fs, but where we still say we don't bear A **at all** to o. Often there's a risk o is F.

The access problem casts doubt on our ability reliably to rid ourselves of non-doxastic attitudes.[48] We would have strong reason to doubt that our apparent reasoning to that effect succeeded in any given case, given how hostage our attitudes are to empirical facts that we don't necessarily know.

Before closing this section out, I want to respond to a couple "quick" ways to respond to this puzzle. The first is the simplest to state and to respond to, since the way I've put things was designed to do exactly that. So, you may think that someone who (truly) says (18) really need only *pro tanto* resent the mayor, whereas (4) merely claims that the resentment doesn't rise above some threshold so that it can count as genuine resentment.[49] But what (4) actually says is that the speaker doesn't resent them *at all*. It also answers a variant of this quick response, where the speaker self-ascribes a lack of resentment of the zookeeper and circus leader *for their possible negligence in bear-keeping*, whereas in (18) the speaker self-ascribes resentment *for voting for the mayor*.[50] If you resent someone for x, you resent them at least a bit; but if you don't resent them *at all*, you don't resent them a bit. So I think this won't work either.

Second, we might be tempted to invoke guises or modes of presentation here. Thus we might say that the speaker resents the zookeeper and circus leader under the voting-for-the-mayor guise, but not at all under the 'zookeeper'- and 'circus leader'-guises. This is in a way a very natural thing to try, even if it's difficult to give a proper theory of guises. Unfortunately

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[47] For important work on free relatives that would verify this entailment, see, e.g., Jacobson (1995), Dayal (1997), and von Fintel (2000).

[48] Why do I say *non-doxastic* attitudes? Well, because I think we can't form general (*de dicto*) doxastic attitudes to whatever has a certain property like we can with these other attitudes. See Drucker (forthcoming) for arguments for that claim. But perhaps we can with *de re* belief. If so, what I say is meant to apply to that case, too, but I think it's an interesting issue I need to think more about still. Thanks to Wolfgang Schwarz here.

[49] Thanks to Dmitri Gallow and Neil Sinhababu here.

[50] Thanks to Annina Loets here.

I don't think it can work. The reason is that, for the relevant non-doxastic attitudes, our attitudes "pierce" the guises. To see what I mean, consider:

(22) If Nikki Haley is the anonymous op-ed author,[51] I resent her for not speaking out more publicly and forcefully than she has.

The point, of course, is that I don't know that Haley is the anonymous op-ed author. And yet in the consequent I self-ascribe resentment *under the Haley guise* (if under any guise at all). It's easy to come up with examples like this for any of the non-doxastic attitudes that you can think of. But that said, one could doubt that this is really a conditional of the right form. Since I defend that in other work, I'll just assume it here.[52] So I don't think this quick solution will help much either. Still, the objection was helpful to discuss, in part since conditionals like these will play a significant role in the next section.

So, the access problem remains: in order to eliminate some of our attitudes, we need access to them and their objects that we don't have. But since we so often say things like (5) and (18), it seems that not only will we face this difficulty in attitude elimination, but also we will have to say that much of our ordinary attitude self-ascriptional practice is irrational or confused. Since neither result appeals to me much, it's worth looking for a different, more solid solution to this problem. That's what I'll do in the next, last substantive section.

6 Solving the Access Problem with Constraint Acceptance

It seems to me that we are more or less forced to treat some (18)-like examples as having an implicit restriction on the quantifier's ('whoever''s) domain. Then the simplest thing to do would be to find a general implicit restriction involved in (18)-like cases generally. That's the basic structure of this section. So, I'll start with the example.

Consider:

(23) Someone dented my car, and I resent whoever did it. Of course, if it was my mother, I don't resent her at all, but I think she didn't do it.

I claim that this sort of utterance, which I think is unexceptional, can only be a rational or reasonable thing to say or think if the 'whoever' is implicitly restricted. For the first two sentences seem to entail that if their mother dented their car, they both resent and don't resent their mother (at all). But that entails that the speaker's mother can't have done it. Granted, the speaker *thinks* their mother didn't do it, but they make room for that very possibility in the second sentence with the conditional. So the possibility is a live one, meaning it's not true that the speaker takes it for granted that their mother

didn't do it. Nor should we think that the second sentence *corrects* (that is, retracts) the first; the speaker should see no reason to do that, since they think their mother didn't actually dent their car.

This is all much more reasonable if we take 'whoever' to be implicitly restricted, so that the logical form is (ignoring the first part):

(24) [every x: DENT(x) & $F(x)$][RESENT(me, x)] & (DENT(mother) $\rightarrow$ ¬RESENT(me, mother)) & BELIEVE(me, ¬DENT(mother))

In this way, everything the speaker says in (23) can be reasonable. Though the speaker does believe their mother didn't dent their car, they don't think the situation utterly impossible; thus it makes sense to provision for the possibility in which she did dent their car with the conditional.

Still, this strategy raises some important questions. First, how general can we make it: can we solve the general version of the access problem with it? Second, how does $\ulcorner F \urcorner$ relate to the conditional? We should really not want F-ness to be being the speaker's mother—that would be strange and too specific, and not recoverable until the speaker actually says the conditional. Intuitively, they never need have done that in order to have said exactly the same thing with the first sentence that they did when they do utter the conditional. So we'll want something that does relate to the conditional, but which a competent addressee can work out in interpreting the speaker without the speaker needing to say any specific conditionals like in (23).

In the rest of this section, I'll answer those two questions. To do that, I'll need to introduce a different attitude.[53] To see that it's already part of our tacit folk psychology, consider utterances like the following:

(25) Since it's pretty warm outside, however likely it is that it'll snow today, it's likelier than that that it'll rain today. But I have no idea how likely it is to rain or snow today.

(26) Since it's pretty warm outside, I'm more confident that it'll rain today than that it'll snow, but I have no idea how confident to be in either rain or snow today.

(27) Billie is much more of an iconoclast than Barry is, in an industry that only just barely tolerates iconoclasm. So, man, Billie is so much cooler than Barry, but I'm not totally sure exactly how cool Billie is or how uncool Barry is.

(28) ...So, I admire Billie much more than I admire Barry, though I haven't decided yet how much I admire Billie or Barry.

I will call these all **ungrounded attitudinal comparisons**, because they express or report having more of an attitude toward o than toward o', despite there being no specific "amount" of that attitude that they have toward o or to o'. The question, then, is what exactly they express or report.

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[53] In saying this, I also want to say straightaway that it may very well reduce to other attitudes; I won't focus much on the metaphysics here, but rather just its functional role and how we express it in language.

Here's an answer that seems to me to be right. (25) expresses, roughly, a commitment of the following sort: if they were to just totally decide how to fill in their confidences fully and completely, the amount of confidence they have in the proposition that it'll rain that day would be greater than the amount of confidence they would have in the proposition that it'll snow that day.[54] Then (25) would really be expressing such credences. (26) *reports* that commitment: it is *made true* by the existence of that commitment; to be true, apart from the commitment itself, there need be no amount of confidence that the speaker has in either rain or snow.

The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of (27) an (28). The first expresses a commitment to admiring Billie more than Barry, however the speaker's admiration is to be completely filled in; and the latter reports that same state.[55]

Let's generalize all this and be a bit more precise. I will say that an **A-type attitudinal constraint** is a requirement for an overall A-state to have. To be gappy—there being propositions p such that S's overall belief state doesn't include the belief that p or the belief that $\neg p$—is one belief-type (i.e., doxastic) constraint, for example. I won't be fussy about what *kind* of requirement this is, by the way. As far as this definition is concerned, a requirement of any of the usual types will do. Another would be the requirement to admire Billie more than Barry.

Given that, S **accepts an A-type attitudinal constraint** for their overall A-type state to be F just when, were S to fill out their overall A-type state completely and fully without incurring any other changes through, e.g., empirical investigation,[56] S would be—from their own perspective—irrational unless their resulting A-type state was F.

These definitions, when put together, get us what (25)–(28) are intuitively expressing or reporting. Given that, we should think we have such states or attitudes as states of attitudinal constraint acceptance, given that we seem to need them to account for unexceptional things we say, ungrounded attitudinal comparisons.

Ungrounded attitudinal comparisons make use of states of attitudinal constraint acceptance to be F, where F is a *comparative* property. But F could

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[54] Perhaps this is best accomplished with imprecise credences of some kind. But if we go this route, we have to be careful. If we think of imprecise credence functions as interval-valued, then we won't have enough structure to capture what (25) expresses, since the intervals can overlap even when the agent really does have the mental state they seem to express with (25). But we can also think of imprecise credence functions as *sets* of precise credence functions, called *representors*; these would have the right structure, e.g., with precise credence functions cr_1, cr_2 in the agent's representor such that, e.g., $cr_1(rain) = .3$, $cr_1(snow) = .2$, $cr_2(rain) = .5$, $cr_2(snow) = .4$. Ultimately I'm disinclined to think that (25) really does express such imprecise credences, because I think even that state is too decided to be what the speaker in (25) intends to express. But, like I said before, the metaphysics of such states will not concern me too much; in practice what a person with such imprecise credences really has just is the kind of commitment I describe.

[55] Ungrounded attitudinal comparisons are a problem for theories of attitudinal comparisons, i.e., ⌜S A-s o more than S A-s o'⌝, that require there to be some amount (intensity, etc.) of A-ing that S has toward o that is greater than the amount of A-ing that S has toward o'. The best-developed semantic work on these, Pasternak (2019), does make that assumption, and thus is not correct in general.

[56] All the relevant changes I mean to rule out might be very difficult to spell out. Granted, but I don't think the difficulties there hurt the definition in principle.

be any property of an overall *A*-type state. In particular it could be a *negative* property, *not* being *G*. Consider, e.g.:

(29) It's at the very least *possible* that there will be a good *Star Wars* sequel one day, though I have no idea how likely it is there will be one.

(30) I do not hate my mother *at all*, no matter what she did.

(31) I don't want to work for them no matter what the benefits of doing so would be.

In each of these, we need the states of attitudinal constraint acceptance because they are different from, e.g., simply not being certain that there won't be a good *Star Wars* sequel one day (for (29)), or simply not hating their mother (for (30)), or simply not positively wanting to work for someone (for (31)). After all, to be in those latter states, it could suffice that the speaker hadn't considered the relevant things as possible objects of certainty, etc.[57] States of negative attitudinal constraint acceptance are different, and we need them to understand these three sorts of utterances. But of course they should be available, since the comparative ones were available, too.

What's more, we can use such states to solve the access problem. Here's how. With an implicit quantifier restriction, the general form of (18) is:

(32) [the people x: VOTED-FOR(x, mayor) & $F(x)$][RESENT(me, x)].

F-ness, I claim, is the property of not being ruled out as an object of resentment by the speaker's states of negative attitudinal constraint acceptance. To have a handy name, I'll call it **A-type compatibility** (sometimes tagged to particular people). Thus what (18) really says, on this view, is that the speaker resents anyone who voted for the mayor who is resentment-compatible (for that speaker). But by (4) we know that the zookeeper and circus leader are not resentment-compatible. Hence there is no clash, and not even a risk of one. The speaker in these cases was not irrational.

And the solution generalizes readily. If I'm right, then, there is no in-principle difficulty to reliably reasoning to eliminate our attitudes in these situations, nor is there any irrationality in speaking the way we do.

So am I right? It's a substantive, empirical claim that this is how utterances like (18) tend to work. There are general reasons to think that it's on the right track. Charity, especially, makes this a good restriction with which to interpret speakers. This restriction does, it seem, minimize the sort of risk involved in speaking in these ways. More importantly, though, are conditionals like (22) and the one in (23). They indicate which negative attitudinal constraints we really do accept and which ones we don't. Thus:

(33) Even if my mother is the one who's kicking my seat, I don't resent her

(33) expresses the speaker's negative attitudinal constraint acceptance not to resent their mother (at least, not for kicking their seat). In order to say such

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[57] Compare Friedman (2013) on why suspension of judgment ought to be conceived of as its own attitude rather than a lack of a given doxastic attitude.

conditionals in a way that expresses this state, they need to keep track of such things; thus their general attitude self-ascriptions *better* be sensitive to these things, too, in the way the conditionals they utter already are. Basically: these states are linguistically important in a variety of ways, namely in ungrounded comparisons and these conditionals. It's a minimal and parsimonious theory that extends their use to general self-ascriptions like (18) in the form of implicit quantifier domain restrictions. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, using these states this way allows us to solve the access problem. In order to fully assess this answer, of course, others would have to put forward their own, rival answers. But so far, mine seems appealing.

Of course, people rarely have negative attitudinal constraints straight out. I may not resent my mom if she dented my car or voted for the wrong person, maybe, but if she defrauds a lot of people out of their life savings, I would. So I don't have a negative attitudinal constraint not to resent my mom, no matter what. Really what I have is a commitment not to resent her *for doing such-and-such*. This doesn't present a problem in principle for the solution I presented, rather it just complicates things a bit. Given that I think there's no chance that she's defrauded a lot of people out of their life savings, I can still feel comfortable saying I don't resent her at all, even if maybe she's the one who dented my car. Any given individual will have these more complex commitments; still, the essential shape of my solution will be the same, even given this added complexity.

Here's the general view I've arrived at. We can reason to pretty much any change in attitude, including to a lack of a given non-doxastic object to an attitude. But in that case, we need to leverage a sort of trick to do it: we need to reason to states of negative attitudinal constraint acceptance, so that our general attitudes are constrained in the right way by our commitments. This is a different mechanism than those at work in other changes in attitude. To me, it's interesting and surprising that attitudinal change can, and I think does, work that way. If I'm right, then the access problem will have been what allowed us to see it.

7   Conclusion

I did a lot in this paper, so a summary should be useful. My main aim was to argue for Generalism, roughly the view that we can reason to pretty much any attitudinal change. To defend it, I argued for Argumentalism, a sufficient condition linking being convinced by the right sort of argument on the one hand and reasoning on the other; and I also argued that there really do exist the right sorts of arguments for all these different attitudinal changes. I closed with a problem for eliminating especially non-doxastic attitudes, the access problem; to solve it, I argued that we should appeal to implicit quantifier restrictions with states of negative attitudinal constraint acceptance. We need these states anyway, and they solve the problem in a non-intrusive and parsimonious way.

I began by saying that there might have been a subfield of philosophy that treated rational and reasonable change in attitude indifferently, whether the attitude in question was belief or relief or whatever else. I consider this paper

an example of what would be done in such a subfield; I hope it has shown the fruit of thinking in this way.

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